

International Political Economy
Wednesdays, 2:15PM - 4:45PM

James Bisbee

Office Hours: Wednesdays 5-6PM or by appointment

Course Description: The world's international relations have always been inseparable from economics. Goods are traded across borders, people migrate across borders, and capital flows across borders. This course is fundamentally about these movements, and how they interact with politics.

This interaction operates in two directions. On the one hand, the movement of goods, people, and capital *influences* politics at the local, sub-national, and national levels. Trade affects labor markets and consumption, both of which result in individuals overcoming barriers of collective action to alter the course of politics. Immigration influences politics through myriad channels, ranging from sparking nativist reactions among the citizenry to quite literally altering the demographics of a nation. And the movement of wealth can transport politics along with it, as illustrated by the recent backlash against multinational corporations like the NBA and the videogame company Blizzard for silencing voices that support the protesters in Hong Kong, and thus raise the ire of the CCP.

On the other hand, politics determines how these cross-border flows are routed, again with the action playing out at the local, sub-national, and national levels. Lobbying by domestic firms influences the particulars of trade agreements. Domestic political institutions circumscribe the limits of what these actors can do. And states bargain on the international arena.

This course introduces students to the politics of international economic relations. It begins with a broad overview of the core conceptual frameworks in the field of IPE. It then summarizes the key elements of IPE research, examining the flow of money, goods, and people across borders. The course concludes with an overview of how these elements cohere and evolve in what is popularly known as globalization. Given the constraints of a 14 week session, there are myriad important contributions to the field of IPE that must be omitted. Students are encouraged to engage with the suggested reading and attend office hours to learn more about research that we are unable to cover in class.

Grade Distribution:

- **Class Participation (15%):** Students are expected to attend every class having read the assigned readings. They should be prepared to critically evaluate the arguments, paying special attention to (1) how they contribute to debates in the broader literature; (2) whether the theoretical intuition is coherent; (3) whether the empirical strategies are convincing tests of these theories; and (4) how each paper's shortcomings might inspire future research.
- **Critical Reviews (30%):** Students are required to write a short one-page critical review on one of the assigned readings each week. These must be uploaded to Brightspace by 9PM the Monday prior to when we discuss the readings in class. Critical review assignments will be determined during the first class.
- **Discussion Leaders (20%):** Each student is required to lead the discussion at some point during the semester. As leader, students are expected to moderate the discussion for that week, starting with an opening set of remarks in which the students synthesize the assigned readings. These remarks should note similarities and differences across the three core components of research: the research question, the theory or theoretical intuition, and the empirical strategy. Discussion leader duties will be assigned during the first class.
- **Original Research Proposal (20%):** Students are expected to write a proposal for an original piece of research. The final proposal must be submitted to Brightspace by the final day of class and should be between 10 and 15 pages long. It should contain: (1) a clearly defined research question that is well-motivated and speaks to a gap in the literature; (2) either a formal theoretical model or a cogent theoretical discussion about how to interpret the research question; (3) a description of the empirical evidence that will be used to evaluate the hypothesis that is produced by the theory; and (4) a description of the methods used to convincingly connect the proposed empirical evidence to the research question. Students must give a 10-minute presentation on their proposal idea midway through the semester, which will be followed by a 10-minute discussion by their peers.
- **Reviewer 2 (15%):** Students will role-play as Reviewer 2 and provide single-blind comments on each other's final proposals in week of final exams. These comments should be no more than a page, and should be written to provide constructive criticism and actionable suggestions to improve the proposed research idea.

Academic Honesty Policy Summary:

Students are assumed to have read and agreed with the Vanderbilt University Academic Honesty policy, found at URL: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/student_handbook/the-honor-system/. Academic misconduct includes, but is not limited to, cheating, fabrication, plagiarism, altering graded examinations for additional credit, having another person take an examination for you, falsification of results, or facilitating academic dishonesty or as further specified in the university policy found at the website above. These and other forms of cheating are all potentially grounds for penalties including failure of the assignment or the course, as well as program- or university-level disciplinary action.

Classroom Culture:

I believe that good research requires criticism, and recognize that the nature of the course is designed to stimulate critical thinking, both with respect to the published work we will read, as well as with respect to the students' own research proposals. I will work to create an environment where the quality of research is understood as separate from the quality of the researcher, and expect students to use language that contributes to this environment. This includes but is not limited to maintaining an open, inclusive, anti-racist, and mutually respectful atmosphere in the classroom. However, I know that I can do better in this regard, and welcome feedback from students on how I can best live up to that commitment in my teaching. If you see something, please say something. Feel free to reach out to me at any point with feedback.

Enormous gratitude to Nikhar Gaikwad (<https://nikhargaikwad.com/>) for providing his syllabus, to which this is heavily indebted.

Tentative Course Outline:

The weekly coverage might change as it depends on the progress of the class. However, you must keep up with the reading assignments. Any adjustments to the syllabus will be clearly communicate via email and updated in **red** on this syllabus.

Week	Content
1/11	<p>Introduction</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suggested Readings: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa L Martin. International political economy: Global and domestic interactions. <i>Political science: The state of the discipline</i>, pages 118–146, 2002 – Benjamin J Cohen. <i>International political economy</i>. Routledge, 2017, chapter 1 – Dani Rodrik. Political economy of trade policy. <i>Handbook of international economics</i>, 3:1457–1494, 1995
1/18	<p>International Context, Geopolitics, and Trade Policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Stephen D. Krasner. State power and the structure of international trade. <i>World Politics</i>, 28(3):317–347, apr 1976 – Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield. Power politics and international trade. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 87(2):408–420, jun 1993 – Allison Carnegie and Nikhar Gaikwad. Public opinion on geopolitics and trade. <i>World Politics</i>, 74(2):167–204, apr 2022 – Robert O Keohane. <i>After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy</i>. Princeton university press, 2005, chapters 1, 5-7 • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Daniel Berger, William Easterly, Nathan Nunn, and Shanker Satyanath. Commercial imperialism? political influence and trade during the cold war. <i>American Economic Review</i>, 103(2):863–896, apr 2013 – Joanne Gowa. <i>Allies, adversaries, and international trade</i>. Princeton University Press, 1995 – Edward D Mansfield. <i>Power, trade, and war</i>. Princeton University Press, 2021 – Christina L. Davis and Sophie Meunier. Business as usual? economic responses to political tensions. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 55(3):628–646, feb 2011 – Joanne Gowa. Bipolarity, multipolarity, and free trade. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 83(4):1245–1256, dec 1989 – Albert O Hirschman. <i>National power and the structure of foreign trade</i>, volume 105. Univ of California Press, 1980 – Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. 1. ideas and foreign policy: An analytical framework. In Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, editors, <i>Ideas and Foreign Policy</i>, pages 3–30. Cornell University Press, dec 2019

Week	Content
1/25	<p>Societal Coalition Models of Trade Policymaking</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter. What determines individual trade-policy preferences? <i>Journal of International Economics</i>, 54(2):267–292, aug 2001 – Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox. Learning to love globalization: Education and individual attitudes toward international trade. <i>International Organization</i>, 60(02), apr 2006 – Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz. Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety. <i>International Organization</i>, 63(3):425–457, jul 2009 – Sungmin Rho and Michael Tomz. Why don't trade preferences reflect economic self-interest? <i>International Organization</i>, 71(S1):S85–S108, apr 2017 • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik. Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others? <i>European Economic Review</i>, 49(6):1393–1430, aug 2005 – Wolfgang Mayer. The tariff equivalence of import standards. <i>International Economic Review</i>, 23(3):723, oct 1982 – Andy Baker. Who wants to globalize? consumer tastes and labor markets in a theory of trade policy beliefs. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 49(4):924–938, oct 2005 – Benjamin O. Fordham and Katja B. Kleinberg. How can economic interests influence support for free trade? <i>International Organization</i>, 66(2):311–328, apr 2012 – Alexandra Guisinger. Determining trade policy: Do voters hold politicians accountable? <i>International Organization</i>, 63(3):533–557, jul 2009 – Xiaobo Lü, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. Inequity aversion and the international distribution of trade protection. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 56(3):638–654, apr 2012 – Helen V. Milner and Dustin H. Tingley. Who supports global economic engagement? the sources of preferences in american foreign economic policy. <i>International Organization</i>, 65(1):37–68, jan 2011 – Ronald Rogowski. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 81(4):1121–1137, dec 1987 – David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. Importing political polarization? the electoral consequences of rising trade exposure. Technical report, sep 2016

Week	Content
2/01	<p>Special Interest Models of Trade Policymaking</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Protection for sale. Technical report, aug 1992 – Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi. Protection for sale: An empirical investigation. <i>American Economic Review</i>, 89(5):1135–1155, dec 1999 – MICHAEL J. HISCOX. Commerce, coalitions, and factor mobility: Evidence from congressional votes on trade legislation. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 96(3):593–608, sep 2002 – IN SONG KIM. Political cleavages within industry: Firm-level lobbying for trade liberalization. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 111(1):1–20, feb 2017 • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Jeffrey W. Ladewig. Domestic influences on international trade policy: Factor mobility in the united states, 1963 to 1992. <i>International Organization</i>, 60(01), jan 2006 – Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee. Is trade policy for sale? congressional voting on recent trade bills. Technical report, jan 1998 – Michael Bailey. Quiet influence: The representation of diffuse interests on trade policy, 1983-94. <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly</i>, 26(1):45, feb 2001 – Kishore Gawande and Usree Bandyopadhyay. Is protection for sale? evidence on the grossman-helpman theory of endogenous protection. <i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i>, 82(1):139–152, feb 2000 – Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Allison Carnegie, and Nikhar Gaikwad. Economic crises and trade policy competition. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i>, 2015 – Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi. Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy? Technical report, mar 2009 – Iain Osgood, Dustin Tingley, Thomas Bernauer, In Song Kim, Helen V. Milner, and Gabriele Spilker. The charmed life of superstar exporters: Survey evidence on firms and trade policy. <i>The Journal of Politics</i>, 79(1):133–152, jan 2017 – Helen Milner. Resisting the protectionist temptation: industry and the making of trade policy in france and the united states during the 1970s. <i>International Organization</i>, 41(4):639–665, 1987 – Devashish Mitra. Endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection: A long-run model of trade policy determination. <i>American Economic Review</i>, 89(5):1116–1134, dec 1999

Week	Content
2/08	<p>Domestic Institutions and Trade Policymaking</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – James E. Alt and Michael Gilligan. The political economy of trading states: Factor specificity, collective action problems and domestic political institutions. <i>Journal of Political Philosophy</i>, 2(2):165–192, jun 1994 – Michael A. Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. The institutional roots of american trade policy: Politics, coalitions, and international trade. <i>World Politics</i>, 49(3):309–338, apr 1997 – Michael J. Hiscox. The magic bullet? the RTAA, institutional reform, and trade liberalization. <i>International Organization</i>, 53(4):669–698, 1999 – Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota. Why the move to free trade? democracy and trade policy in the developing countries. <i>International Organization</i>, 59(01), jan 2005 • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. Free to trade: Democracies, autocracies, and international trade. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 94(2):305–321, jun 2000 – Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. <i>International Organization</i>, 42(3):427–460, 1988 – Douglas A. Irwin and Randall S. Kroszner. Interests, institutions, and ideology in securing policy change: The republican conversion to trade liberalization after smoot-hawley. <i>The Journal of Law and Economics</i>, 42(2):643–674, oct 1999 – Edward D. Mansfield and Marc L. Busch. The political economy of nontariff barriers: a cross-national analysis. <i>International Organization</i>, 49(4):723–749, 1995 – Ronald Rogowski. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 81(4):1121–1137, dec 1987 – Judith Goldstein and Robert Gulotty. America and trade liberalization: The limits of institutional reform. <i>International Organization</i>, 68(2):263–295, 2014 – Jong Hee Park and Nathan Jensen. Electoral competition and agricultural support in OECD countries. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 51(2):314–329, apr 2007

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2/15	<p>The Political Economy of Conflict: Trade</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Mansfield and Pollins - Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction – Morrow (1999) - How Could Trade Affect Conflict (IO) – Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) - Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict (IO) – Fordham (2007) - Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American Intervention in World War I (IO) – Davis (2021) - War as a Redistributive Problem (AJPS) • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Kyle Bagwell and Robert W Staiger. An economic theory of GATT. <i>American Economic Review</i>, 89(1):215–248, mar 1999 – CHRISTINA L. DAVIS. International institutions and issue linkage: Building support for agricultural trade liberalization. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 98(1):153–169, feb 2004 – Christina L Davis. Why adjudicate? In <i>Why Adjudicate?</i> Princeton University Press, 2012 – Allison Carnegie. <i>Power Plays</i>. Cambridge University Press, sep 2015 – Joanne Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim. An exclusive country club: The effects of the GATT on trade, 1950–94. <i>World Politics</i>, 57(4):453–478, jul 2005 – Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore. The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. <i>International Organization</i>, 53(4):699–732, 1999 – B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner. The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape. <i>International Organization</i>, 55(4):829–857, 2001 – B. PETER ROSENDORFF. Stability and rigidity: Politics and design of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 99(3):389–400, aug 2005

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2/22	<p>The Political Economy of the Environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Scott Barrett. The theory of international environmental agreements. <i>Handbook of environmental economics</i>, 3:1457–1516, 2005 – Michael M. Bechtel and Kenneth F. Scheve. Mass support for global climate agreements depends on institutional design. <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</i>, 110(34):13763–13768, jul 2013 – Meir Alkon and Erik H. Wang. Pollution lowers support for china’s regime: Quasi-experimental evidence from beijing. <i>The Journal of Politics</i>, 80(1):327–331, jan 2018 – SARAH SUNN BUSH and AMANDA CLAYTON. Facing change: Gender and climate change attitudes worldwide. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, pages 1–18, aug 2022 • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Dustin Tingley and Michael Tomz. Conditional cooperation and climate change. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i>, 47(3):344–368, nov 2013 – Paul Wapner. Politics beyond the state environmental activism and world civic politics. <i>World Politics</i>, 47(3):311–340, apr 1995 – Thomas Bernauer. Climate change politics. <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i>, 16(1):421–448, may 2013 – Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta. The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy. <i>International Organization</i>, 48(1):77–105, 1994 – Michèle B. Bättig and Thomas Bernauer. National institutions and global public goods: Are democracies more cooperative in climate change policy? <i>International Organization</i>, 63(2):281–308, apr 2009 – Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor. Cooperation and discord in global climate policy. <i>Nature Climate Change</i>, 6(6):570–575, may 2016 – Federica Genovese. Sectors, pollution, and trade: How industrial interests shape domestic positions on global climate agreements. <i>International Studies Quarterly</i>, 63(4):819–836, aug 2019 – Jeff D. Colgan, Jessica F. Green, and Thomas N. Hale. Asset revaluation and the existential politics of climate change. <i>International Organization</i>, 75(2):586–610, dec 2020 – Amanda Kennard. The enemy of my enemy: When firms support climate change regulation. <i>International Organization</i>, 74(2):187–221, 2020 – Matto Mildemberger. <i>Carbon Captured</i>. The MIT Press, 2020 – Michaël Aklin and Matto Mildemberger. Prisoners of the wrong dilemma: Why distributive conflict, not collective action, characterizes the politics of climate change. <i>Global Environmental Politics</i>, 20(4):4–27, nov 2020

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3/01	<p>The Political Economy of Migration Policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – JENS HAINMUELLER and MICHAEL J. HISCOX. Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 104(1):61–84, feb 2010 – Neil Malhotra, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. Economic explanations for opposition to immigration: Distinguishing between prevalence and conditional impact. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 57(2):391–410, jan 2013 – Margaret E. Peters. Trade, foreign direct investment, and immigration policy making in the united states. <i>International Organization</i>, 68(4):811–844, 2014 – Nikhar Gaikwad and Gareth Nellis. Do politicians discriminate against internal migrants? evidence from nationwide field experiments in india. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 65(4):790–806, aug 2020 • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Jess Benhabib. On the political economy of immigration. <i>European Economic Review</i>, 40(9):1737–1743, dec 1996 – Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda. Does the welfare state affect individual attitudes toward immigrants? evidence across countries. <i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i>, 91(2):295–314, may 2009 – Anna Maria Mayda. Who is against immigration? a cross-country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants. <i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i>, 88(3):510–530, aug 2006 – Jens Hainmueller and Daniel J. Hopkins. Public attitudes toward immigration. <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i>, 17(1):225–249, may 2014 – Rafaela M. Dancygier and Michael J. Donnelly. Sectoral economies, economic contexts, and attitudes toward immigration. <i>The Journal of Politics</i>, 75(1):17–35, jan 2013 – Jens Hainmueller and Daniel J. Hopkins. Public attitudes toward immigration. <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i>, 17(1):225–249, may 2014 – JENS HAINMUELLER and DOMINIK HANGARTNER. Who gets a swiss passport? a natural experiment in immigrant discrimination. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 107(1):159–187, feb 2013 – Nikhar Gaikwad and Gareth Nellis. The majority-minority divide in attitudes toward internal migration: Evidence from mumbai. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 61(2):456–472, dec 2016 – CHRISTOPHER RUDOLPH. Security and the political economy of international migration. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 97(4):603–620, nov 2003 – NIKHAR GAIKWAD and GARETH NELLIS. Overcoming the political exclusion of migrants: Theory and experimental evidence from india. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 115(4):1129–1146, jun 2021

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3/08	<p>The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Jeffrey A. Frieden. International investment and colonial control: a new interpretation. <i>International Organization</i>, 48(4):559–593, 1994 – LESLIE JOHNS and RACHEL L. WELLHAUSEN. Under one roof: Supply chains and the protection of foreign investment. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 110(1):31–51, feb 2016 – Sonal S. Pandya. Democratization and foreign direct investment liberalization, 1970-2000. <i>International Studies Quarterly</i>, 58(3):475–488, jun 2014 – Edmund J. Malesky, Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, and Nathan M. Jensen. Monopoly money: Foreign investment and bribery in vietnam, a survey experiment. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 59(2):419–439, sep 2014 • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Nathan M. Jensen. Democratic governance and multinational corporations: Political regimes and inflows of foreign direct investment. <i>International Organization</i>, 57(3):587–616, 2003 – W. Henisz. The institutional environment for multinational investment. <i>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</i>, 16(2):334–364, oct 2000 – Quan Li. Democracy, autocracy, and expropriation of foreign direct investment. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i>, 42(8):1098–1127, feb 2009 – Tim Büthe and Helen V. Milner. The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: Increasing FDI through international trade agreements? <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 52(4):741–762, oct 2008 – Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. Competing for capital: The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960–2000. <i>International Organization</i>, 60(04), oct 2006 – Srividya Jandhyala, Witold J. Henisz, and Edward D. Mansfield. Three waves of BITs. <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i>, 55(6):1047–1073, aug 2011 – Edmund J. Malesky. Straight ahead on red: How foreign direct investment empowers subnational leaders. <i>The Journal of Politics</i>, 70(1):97–119, jan 2008 – Erica Owen. The political power of organized labor and the politics of foreign direct investment in developed democracies. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i>, 48(13):1746–1780, aug 2015 – Sonal S. Pandya. Labor markets and the demand for foreign direct investment. <i>International Organization</i>, 64(3):389–409, jul 2010 – Jennifer L. Tobin and Marc L. Busch. A BIT is better than a lot: Bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements. <i>World Politics</i>, 62(1):1–42, dec 2009

Week	Content
3/15	Spring Break
3/22	<p>The Political Economy of Finance, Money and Debt</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Barry Eichengreen. Globalizing capital. In <i>Globalizing Capital</i>. Princeton University Press, 2008. pp. 3-34. – Jeffrey A. Frieden. Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance. <i>International Organization</i>, 45(4):425–451, 1991 – Michael Tomz. Reputation and international cooperation. In <i>Reputation and International Cooperation</i>. Princeton University Press, 2012, chapters 1 and 2. – Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc Melitz. International economics: Theory and policy, the latest edition, 2017, pages 317-378. • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – David Stasavage. Cities, constitutions, and sovereign borrowing in europe, 1274–1785. <i>International Organization</i>, 61(03), jul 2007 – J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffrey A. Frieden. The political economy of exchange rates. In <i>The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy</i>, pages 587–598. Oxford University Press, sep 2009 – BETH A. SIMMONS and ZACHARY ELKINS. The globalization of liberalization: Policy diffusion in the international political economy. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 98(1):171–189, feb 2004 – Jeffrey Chwieroth. Neoliberal economists and capital account liberalization in emerging markets. <i>International Organization</i>, 61(02), apr 2007 – John Gerard Ruggie. International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. <i>International Organization</i>, 36(2):379–415, 1982 – Helen V. Milner and Bumba Mukherjee. Democratization and economic globalization. <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i>, 12(1):163–181, jun 2009 – William Bernhard and David Leblang. Democratic institutions and exchange-rate commitments. <i>International Organization</i>, 53(1):71–97, 1999 – William Roberts Clark and Mark Hallerberg. Mobile capital, domestic institutions, and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 94(2):323–346, jun 2000 – Michael M. Bechtel, Jens Hainmueller, and Yotam Margalit. Preferences for international redistribution: The divide over the eurozone bailouts. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 58(4):835–856, mar 2014 – Cameron Ballard-Rosa. Hungry for change: Urban bias and autocratic sovereign default. <i>International Organization</i>, 70(2):313–346, 2016 – Beth A Simmons. <i>Who adjusts?: domestic sources of foreign economic policy during the interwar years</i>, volume 69. Princeton University Press, 2020, Introduction, chapters 3 and 4.

3/29	Draft Research Proposal Presentations
Week	Content
4/05	<p>Globalization and Domestic Politics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Dani Rodrik. Why do more open economies have bigger governments? <i>Journal of Political Economy</i>, 106(5):997–1032, oct 1998 – Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Amalie Jensen, and Kenneth Scheve. Economic decline, social identity, and authoritarian values in the united states. <i>International Studies Quarterly</i>, 66(1), apr 2021 – YOTAM MARGALIT. Costly jobs: Trade-related layoffs, government compensation, and voting in u.s. elections. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 105(1):166–188, feb 2011 – LEONARDO BACCINI and STEPHEN WEYMOUTH. Gone for good: Deindustrialization, white voter backlash, and US presidential voting. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 115(2):550–567, mar 2021 • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Alcía Adserà and Carles Boix. Trade, democracy, and the size of the public sector: The political underpinnings of openness. <i>International Organization</i>, 56(2):229–262, 2002 – Erik Wibbels. Dependency revisited: International markets, business cycles, and social spending in the developing world. <i>International Organization</i>, 60(02), apr 2006 – Geoffrey Garrett. <i>Partisan Politics in the Global Economy</i>. Cambridge University Press, mar 1998 – Dani Rodrik. Has globalization gone too far? <i>Challenge</i>, 41(2):81–94, 1998 – BRIAN GREENHILL, LAYNA MOSLEY, and ASEEM PRAKASH. Trade-based diffusion of labor rights: A panel study, 1986–2002. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 103(4):669–690, oct 2009 – Layna Mosley and Saika Uno. Racing to the bottom or climbing to the top? economic globalization and collective labor rights. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i>, 40(8):923–948, jul 2007 – Layna Mosley. Workers' rights in open economies. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i>, 41(4-5):674–714, apr 2008 – David Vogel. Private global business regulation. <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i>, 11(1):261–282, jun 2008 – Torben Iversen and Thomas R. Cusack. The causes of welfare state expansion: Deindustrialization or globalization? <i>World Politics</i>, 52(3):313–349, apr 2000

Week	Content
04/12	<p>Development and Growth</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned Reading: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century england. <i>The Journal of Economic History</i>, 49(4):803–832, dec 1989 – Kenneth L Sokoloff and Stanley L Engerman. History lessons: Institutions, factor endowments, and paths of development in the new world. <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i>, 14(3):217–232, aug 2000 – Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A Robinson. The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. <i>American Economic Review</i>, 91(5):1369–1401, dec 2001 – Jeffrey B. Nugent. Pranab bardhan.iscarcity, conflicts, and cooperation: Essays in the political and institutional economics of development/i. cambridge, MA: MIT press, 2005. pp. vii306. \$62.00 (cloth) \$26.00 (paper). <i>Economic Development and Cultural Change</i>, 56(2):477–480, jan 2008 • Recommended: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. The economic consequences of legal origins. Technical report, nov 2007 – Jeffrey D. Sachs, Andrew Warner, Anders Aslund, and Stanley Fischer. Economic reform and the process of global integration. <i>Brookings Papers on Economic Activity</i>, 1995(1):1, 1995 – Romain Wacziarg and Karen Horn Welch. Trade liberalization and growth: New evidence. <i>The World Bank Economic Review</i>, 22(2):187–231, jan 2008 – Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik. Distributive politics and economic growth. Technical report, mar 1991
4/19	Final Research Proposal Presentations

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